We are advised to stay calm after reading today's news in the New York Times. A lot of what American and allied forces raided from Saddam Hussein's bureaus, files pertaining to atomic weaponry, are reportedly so conducive to their purpose that a recently opened public exhibition of documents was closed after the International Atomic Energy Agency warned of some documents' heuristic value to countries seeking a forbidden nuclear bomb.
All material in question is identified as dating prior to the 1991 expulsion of Hussein's army from Kuwait. That was when Iraq's nuclear advancements were found to have been understated — please note revelation's subsequence to Hussein's military defeat — and international scrutiny imposed upon Baghdad's further attempts at research. The New York Times is very forward on this point, implying that the question of Ba'athist Iraq's weapons has an inarguable answer. Where the article repeats a charge that "the nation's spy agencies had failed adequately to analyze the 48,000 boxes of documents seized," we will assume it is supposed to read "failed to adequately analyze" — though it was only eleven months ago that journalist Stephen Hayes reported 97 percent of those 48,000 boxes neither translated nor analyzed, i.e., an adequate failure.
The Times continues, explaining that Republican legislators wanted to "reinvigorate the search for clues that Mr. Hussein had resumed his unconventional arms programs in the years before the invasion." As for resumption? "American search teams never found such evidence." But what American search teams found were signs of recidivism. Speakeasies disposed of contraband out of common sense, and only temporarily. Few declared Iraqi stockpiles could be confirmed as destroyed. Even Hussein might have learned to do better than effrontery.
Several commentators have asked the question, Was Saddam Hussein going to just leave all this knowledge locked away? There is a complex answer. Summarized, it is No. From Charles Duelfer's Iraqi Survey Group report, with which one can remind or elucidate himself about Hussein's "Oil for Food" graft, his scientific staff's retention and his long-term plans: "In particular, Saddam was focused on the eventual acquisition of a nuclear weapon, which [adjutant] Tariq Aziz said Saddam was fully committed to acquiring despite the absence of an effective program after 1991."