Glenn Reynolds has begun a rolling entry trading thoughts and links about the observed scale and significance of military action in Iraq against al-Sadr's gangs and the Sunni terrorists in Fallujah.
As the situation progresses, one question remains very relevant: now that the shock of open combat has subsided and Allied troops are only gaining ground, was this indeed a spectacular strategic failure of the authoritarian forces once latent in Iraq? This is not Tet; this is neither "anarchy" nor "chaos"; the perpetrators are not popularly supported. Allied troops are in fair control of the tempo of events. Most importantly, they have a undeniable justification to do militarily what has been difficult politically for nearly a year. At its inception, the Coalition Provisional Authority gave all those in and around Iraq the chance to contribute to a life better than anything a collective people in the Near East had ever known; it was expected that the old guard and fresh opportunists would resist but in the least free part of the world, where rule of the strong is still tradition, that final rejection has been a spasm of violence. By conspicuously embracing violence, the enemies of Iraq have invited military reprisal. Moqtada al-Sadr has forfeited any pretense of cooperative intent, and the Saddamite throwbacks in Fallujah have marked their wolves' den for a smoke-out. If the Allies are determined and thorough, these remnants of Iraq's bestial will won't have much longer to mock the rise of Iraqi liberty.
IRAQIS WEIGH IN: Zeyad's been near despair for days, though in his skepticism lies some wisdom we ought to consider. Alaa recognizes this as the inevitable battle of cultures: one of peaceful liberty and one of forceful compulsion. Ays echoes Alaa's condemnation of the insurgents as "thieves" and "idiots." Omar, as usual, shares my optimism. God bless him - bless them all.
APPLIED SCIENCE: Wretchard is optimistic, too, and offers some solid reasoning as to why:
We are seeing hostage taking tactics plus a few symbolic types of seizures by the Madhi Army. Painful to see, but objectively it is greasy kid stuff. The only really sustained fighting is in Fallujah involving a Marine brigade. So this gives you the measure of the enemy combat power. They have to find some more. Therefore their basic hope is to start a panic, get a bandwagon going. Ergo this hostage routine and symbolic seizure routine. Raise up all Iraq. Uh, huh. That's easier said than done. That fits in just fine with intel and planning cycle, to get the Mahdi Army in a self-identifying process. Knowing what to hit is, with the US forces available, 95% of the problem. The rest is relatively straightforward.A few other comments. During Iraqi Freedom, there were severe logistical problems. The tail stretched back to the Gulf. Aircraft flew thousands of miles. Now the US has dozens of airfields and bases. Logistically, personnel are the easiest of all the move. It's equipment that takes time. We could ship more troops into Iraq, but there's no sign of that and that is information in itself. What is the Press metric for stretched? Look at the air support used in Fallujah. Single aircraft strikes. Well, well within the envelope. That indirectly says a lot about how confident CENTCOM is. When you can tattoo the enemies nose with artistic punches you are in no real trouble. Not saying things are easy, that people aren't dying or getting maimed. But the forces in Iraq are pretty cool. Cooler it seems than we bystanders might be.
A lot of people in Iraq are scared. But I have a feeling among those most worried are the various strains of thugs who are beginning to realize the folly of their overconfidence - lost in the orgy of slaughter, they bet everything in a contest they can't possibly win. Strategic vacuity is our enemies' Achilles' Heel, and our forces had best exploit it.